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COMMENTS
CLASS ACTIONS AND THE ILLINOIS CONSUMER
"Resort to the court is at best cumbersome, but if
the damaged consumer is faced with inefficient procedures when he does go to the court, he is essentially without any rights."'
INTRODUCTION

Many observers of our legal system are concerned with the
plight of consumers defrauded by both large and small businesses.2 Justice is being denied many defrauded consumers because their claims are so small compared to the costs and fees
of a law suit that recourse to the courts in individual actions is
not practicable.3 The equitable concept known as the class action
or representative suit4 would appear to be a method capable of
Reed, Legislating for the Consumer: An Insider's Analysis of the
This article disConsumer Legal Remedies Act, 2 PAC. L.J. 1 9 (1971).
cusses new changes in California's class action law with respect to consumers.
2 See J. CARPER & W. G. MAGNUS, THE DARK SIDE OF THE MARKETPLACE (1968); D. CAPLOVITZ, THE POOR PAY MORE (1963); H. HUBBARD &
J. BISHOP, JR., LET THE SELLER BEWARE (1969); Starrs, The Consumer Class
Action - Part I: Considerations of Equity, 49 B.U.L. REV. 211-12 (1969)
(hereinafter cited as Starrs, Part I); Dole, Merchant and Consumer Protection: The Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act, 76 YALE L.J. 485
(1967); Kripke, Gesture and Reality in Consumer Credit Reform 44
N.Y.U.L. REv. 1, 47 (1969); Comment, Consumer Legislation and the Poor,
76 YALE L.J. 745 (1967); Comment, Law and the Ghetto Consumer, 14
CATHOLIC LAWYER, 214 (1968); Comment, Translating Sympathy for Deceived Consumers into Effective Programs for Protection, 114 U. PA. L. REV.
395 (1966).
8 Deceptive advertising, price gauging, usurious interest rates and similar wrongs are often below $200.00 and hardly sizeable enough to justify
an individual action. The consumer has no choice but to absorb the loss.
In many instances fraudulent operators carefully avoid cheating individuals out of large sums of money because they realize that no one
bilked out of $50 is going to pay a lawyer to get his money back.
Thus the only cases lawyers are willing to handle are those brought
either by the unusual individual who will pay more than the amount of
his claim in order to see justice done, or by those defrauded out of
amounts large enough to justify the expenditure for legal fees. The
number of consumers having no redress because the amount lost is not
commensurate with attorney's fees constitutes the vast majority.
Comment, Translating Sympathy for Deceived Consumers into Effective
Programs for Protection, 114 U. PA. L. REV. 395, 409 (1966).
One can doubt whether a consumer making between $6,000 and $8,000
per year gross income would be willing to invest $250 in a cause of
action that is in all likelihood of less value.
Eovaldi, Private Consumer Substantive and Procedural Remedies Under
State Law, 15 ANTITRUST BULL. 281, 282 (1970).
The court should take judicial notice of the present inability of the
F.T.C., consumer fraud bureaus and offices of the attorneys general of
the various states to cope with the ever pyramiding evidence of fraud in
more and more industries.
J. Starrs, CONSUMER CLASS ACTIONS, HANDBOOK ON CONSUMER LAW 31
(1968).
4 The terms representative suit (or action) and class suit (or action) are
used interchangeably. An action is representative in that the named persons
represent all those in the class and it is a class action in that all persons in
the class are before the court by representation. South E. Nat'l. Bank v.
Briefly, the
Bd. of Educ., 298 Ill. App. 92, 115, 18 N.E.2d 584, 593 (1939).
class action permits a group of persons having a common interest in the
enforcement of their rights to enforce their remedies in a single litigation
at a minimum of expense and inconvenience.
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providing consumers with a remedy for fraud, as well as a
deterrent to its perpetration.5 The purpose of this comment is
to examine the state of the law concerning class actions in Illinois
insofar as they may be a vehicle for the redress of the griev6
ances of defrauded consumers.
Historically, class actions began because of convenience and
expediency. Equity evolved to escape the technicalities and
rigidity of the law courts. 7 It was equity's departure from the
rigid common law requirement that all parties whose interests
may be affected be named and before the court 8 that gave birth
9
to the class action.
5 In the leading case of Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555
(2d Cir. 1968), the Second Circuit Court of Appeals stated that class actions

could:
serve an important function in our judicial system. By establishing a
technique whereby the claims of many individuals can be resolved at the
same time, the class suit both eliminates the possibility of repetitious
litigation and provides small claimants with a method of obtaining redress for claims which would otherwise be too small to warrant indi-

vidual litigation.
Id. at 560. See Escott v. Barchris Constr. Corp., 340 F.2d 731, 733 (2d Cir.
1965). Once the class action controversy is settled, no defendant will treat
as trivial an action in which numerous claims may be enforced against him.
See also, Kalven & Rosenfield, The Contemporary Function of a Class Suit,
8 U. CHI L. REV. 684 (1941), which is an often cited article discussing the
possibilities of the class action as a device to remedy the wrongs suffered
y small claimants; Starrs, The Consumer Class Action - Part II: Considerations of Procedure, 49 B.U.L. REv. 407, 408-19 (1969) (hereinafter cited
as Starrs, Part II.); Dole, Consumer Class Actions Under the Uniform
Deceptive Trade Practices Act, DUKE L.J. 1101 (1968); Eovaldi, Private
Consumer Substantive and Procedural Remedies Under State Law, 15
ANTITRUST BULL. 255, 272-82 (1970).
Moreover, a defendant's objection
to the propriety of a class action is, in effect, his preference to be sued
individulally rather than to settle all claims in one convenient and inexpensive litigation. This may result in an avoidance of litigation altogether.
Weeks v. Bareco Oil Co., 125 F.2d 84, 90 (7th Cir. 1941).
6While the scope of this comment is limited to the plaintiff's side of the
litigation, the rules are equally applicable to a case involving a defendant
litigating in a representative capacity for others similarly situated. The area
of patent infringement lends itself to the use of defendant class action. For
a discussion of problems unique to defendant class actions in this area, see
Technograph Printed Circuits, Ltd. v. Methode Electronics, Inc., 285 F. Supp.
714 (N.D. Ill. 1968); Research Corp. v. Pfister Associated Growers, Inc.,
301 F. Supp. 497 (N.D. Ill. 1969) ; See generally Starrs, Part II, 507, 508;
Comment, Damages in Class Actions, 10 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REv. 615,
619-21 (1969).
7 "Equity has been said to be 'the correction of that wherein the law,
by reason of its universality, is deficient.'" State Life Ins. Co. v. Bd. of Educ.,
401 Ill. 252, 260, 81 N.E.2d 877, 881 (1948). The law courts had numerous
rigid rules that required strict compliance. The sole remedy at law was for
damages; hence a plaintiff seeking any other relief was "without his day".
The equity courts, on the other hand, sought to do complete justice in the
adjudication of rights in controversy between litigants. On the origin and
history of equity jurisprudence, see generally J. STORY, EQUITY PLEADINGS
§§38-58 (14th ed. 1918); POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE, §§1-42a, 68-88
(5th ed. 1941); Z. CHAFEE, SOME PROBLEMS OF EQUITY (1950); Serverns,
Equity and "Fusion" in Illinois, 18 CHI-KENT L. REV. 333 (1940).

8 See South E. Nat'l Bank v. Bd. of Educ., 298 Ill. App. 92, 115, 18
N.E.2d 584, 593 (1938). White v. Macqueen, 360 Ill. 236, 243, 195 N.E.
832, 835 (1935).
11Class suits began as an offshoot of bills of peace with multiple parties.
A common law action soon came to be a two-sided affair, usually with only
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The class action is available in every jurisdiction in one

form or another.

It is codified by statute or court rule in some

jurisdictions ° and remains a matter of judicial decision in others. 1 The typical words of description are:
Where the question is one of common or general interest of many
persons or where the persons who might be made parties are very
numerous and it may be impracticable to bring them all before
12
the court, one or more may sue or defend for the benefit of all.
Illinois uses common law equity rules and precedents to determine the propriety of class action proceedings. 13 There are
no provisions in the Illinois statutes or court rules providing for
the institution of a class action. However, Section 52.1 of the
Illinois Civil Practice Act controls compromise or dismissal of a
class action. This section prohibits compromise or dismissal
except with court approval and upon notice to absent class members.14 Therefore, the maintenance of a class action in Illinois is
one plaintiff and one defendant but sometimes with several plaintiffs or
defendants tightly bound together as joint obligees or obligors, etc. Except
in such joint situations, however, a dispute of one person against many
persons usually had to come before the law courts, if at all, in the form of
many separate actions. Hence it was far cheaper and more convenient to
have a single suit in chancery, which was accustomed to handle polygonal
controversies. Z. CHAFEE, SOME PROBLEMS OF EQUITY, 200-01 (1950). The
Illinois Supreme Court, in White v. Macqueen, 360 Ill. 236, 195 N.E. 832
(1935), said:
To this rule [that all persons interested in the subject matter of the suit
should be named parties] there are, however, two well-established exceptions. The first is where the absent parties are properly represented.
In such a case it is sufficient to make such representatives parties to the
suit. A trustee under a trust deed represents the interest of the bondholders, and when he is made (sic) party to a suit affecting such interest
they are as much bound by the decree rendered in the suit as if they were
individually made parties thereto for the reason that their interests
receive actual and efficient protection. Another exception to the general
rule arises where the beneficiaries are very numerous, so that the delay
and expense of bringing them in becomes oppressive and burdensome. In
such case they will not be deemed necessary parties where the trustee
representing them is made (sic) party.
Id. at 243, 195 N.E. at 835. For an excellent synopsis of the development of
class actions, analyzing the principles behind the equitable rules, see South
E. Nat'l Bank v. Bd. of Educ., 298 Ill. App. 92, 115-24, 18 N.E.2d 584, 593-97
(1938), quoting at length from J. STORY, EQUITY PLEADINGS (9th ed. 1918).
10 For a survey of class actions and their variations in each state
jurisdiction, see Starrs, Part II, 425-96. Starrs categorizes all state jurisdictions and their treatment of the class action, into four types: (1) the
common law (e.g., Illinois), (2) the 1948 Field Code (e.g., New York and
California), (3) the 1938 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 (e.g., Michigan), and (4) the 1966 revision of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 (e.g.,
Arizona).
11 E.g., Illinois.
12 CLARK, CODE PLEADING §63 (2d ed. 1947).

13 See generally Fox, Representative Actions and Proceedings, ILL. L.F.
94-99 (1954) ; Starrs, Part1 425-33.
14 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, §52.1 (1969), providing that:
An action brought on behalf of a class shall not be compromised or dismissed except with the approval of the court and, unless excused for
good cause shown, upon notice as the court may direct.
Compliance with this statutory guideline also requires the court to retain
jurisdiction to supervise the execution of any compromise agreements between the parties. The court will scrutinize the representative's performance
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a matter of judicial decision and is handled by the courts on a
case-to-case basis.
The Illinois courts' approach to the maintenance of a class
action can be thought of as involving three requirements: (1)
the requirement of equity jurisdiction, (2) the requirement of
due process of law under the state and federal constitutions, and
(3) the requirement that all members of the class have a community of interest in the subject matter and the remedy. Although a reading of the Illinois decisions indicates these requirements are interdependent and not distinct, it is felt that
separate consideration of each requirement is an aid to analysis.
The courts have taken divergent views with respect to the
interpretation and application of each requirement. 15 While the
rules stated by earlier Illinois courts would seem to indicate
that consumer class actions could not be maintained,6 recent
courts, influenced by the need to provide an effective remedy for
7
consumer frauds, have found the requirements more easily met.1
Yet, at this writing the requirements still present great obstacles
for consumer class actions in Illinois.
THE REQUIREMENT OF EQUITY JURISDICTION

It would appear that there is no longer a distinction between
law and equity in Illinois by virtue of the 1934 Civil Practice
Act,18 which merged certain legal and equitable procedures, 9 and
the 1964 Judicial Article,20 which eliminated the legal and equitable sides of the Illinois Circuit Courts for jurisdictional purposes.' 1 However, the historical differences between law and
in behalf of the class in order that all interests will be adequately represented.
I Compare Peoples Store v. McKibbin, 379 Ill. 148, 39 N.E.2d 995
(1942) with Harrison Sheet Steel Co. v. Lyons, 15 Ill. 2d 532, 155 N.E.2d
595 (1959). See text between notes 109 and 117 infra.
16 The courts did not discuss the consumer class action although the
restrictive holdings would preclude the maintenance of a consumer class
action as well as other types of class actions. E.g., Fetherston v. Nat'l
Republic Bancorporation, 280 Il. App. 151 (1935), see text between notes
35 and 43 infra; Newberry Library v. Bd. of Educ. 387 Ill. 85, 55 N.E.2d 147
(1944), see text between notes 81 and 87 infra; Kuehn v. Bismarck Hotel
Co., 52 Ill. App. 2d 321, 202 N.E.2d 52 (1964), see text between notes 87
and 93 infra.
17 E.g., Kimbrough v. Parker, 344 I1.
App. 483, 101 N.E.2d 617 (1951);
Holstein v. Montgomery Ward & Co. 3 CCH Pov. L. REP. 9652 (No.
68 CH 275 Cir. Ct. of'Cook County, March 11, 1969). See text between
notes 128 and 147 infra.
18 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110 (1934).
19 The merger was one of form and to the extent of venue, process,
parties, pleadings, pre-trial motions and discovery. Id. For a brief discussion of the 1934 changes, as being procedural not substantive, see
O'Shaughnessy, Suits in Equity Contrastedwith Actions at Law, 11 ILL. L.F.
2, 3-4 (1954).
20 The recently adopted 1970 Constitution retains the same language.
21 The
1870 Constitution provided: "The Circuit Court shall have
original jurisdiction of all causes in law and equity. . . ." The 1964 Judicial
Article provides:

1971]

Consumer Class Actions

equity have not been obliterated for all purposes. It is fundamental that the jurisdiction or power of a court to act 22 differs
23
from the manner in which the court proceeds with its power.
Presently, a Circuit Court judge has the power to hear and
determine any justiciable matter before him, but the underlying

principles of law and equity still control the way he exercises
his power. 24 The judge must still apply equitable principles to
equitable rights and legal principles to legal rights. To illustrate

this important distinction, if a judge grants specific performance
of a contract which does not meet with the equitable require25
ments for specific performance, the reviewing court should
predicate its reversal on reversible error, not want of jurisdiction. The judge's power to render a determination is in no way
dependent on the correctness of his determination.26
One of the differences between law and equity not obliter-

ated by the Civil Practice Act and the Judicial Article is the
equitable concept of the class action. 2 7 The equitable rules and
precedents govern the maintenance of the class action and control

the manner in which the judge proceeds with his jurisdiction.
Thus, in addition to a class action being j usticiable, it must have
a proper equitable basis before the court can correctly proceed

to adjudicate.
The Circuit Court shall have unlimited original jurisdiction of all
justiciable matters, and such powers of review of administrative action
as may be provided by law.
added.)
(Emphasis
22
Jurisdiction is the power of a court to hear and determine the matter
in controversy between the parties. East Side Health Dist. v. Village of
Caseyville, 38 Ill. App. 2d 438, 187 N.E.2d 534 (1963); Collins v. Collins,
14 Ill. App. 2d 350, 144 N.E.2d 845 (1957). See Z. CHAFEE, SOME PROBLEMS
OF EQuiTY 297 et seq. (1950).
23 Rozema v. Quinn, 51 Ill. App. 2d 479, 201 N.E.2d 649 (1964).
24 Id. The fact that the Circuit Court has unlimited jurisdiction of all
justiciable matters does not affect the rule of equity jurisdiction. People
ex rel. Williams v. McDonald, 44 Ill. 2d 349, 255 N.E.2d 400 (1970).
The enactment of the Civil Practice Act has greatly modified the
procedures in civil actions where both legal and equitable claims are
involved, but the constitutional guarantee of trial by jury in actions at
law still requires that certain distinctions between law and equity be
retained.
Rozema v. Quinn, 51 Ill. App. 2d 479, 484, 201 N.E.2d 649, 652 (1964).
79, 52 N.E.2d 143 (1943) ; Severns, Equity
See Dunham v. Kauffman, 385 Ill.
and "Fusion" in Illinois, 18 CHI-KENT L. REv. 333 (1940).
25 Beginning with the 1964 Judicial Article, the circuit court judge has
powers of both equity and law. See note 43 infra.
26 East Side Health Dist. v. Village of Caseyville, 38 Ill. App. 2d 438,
187 N.E.2d 534 (1963).

See Z. CHAFEE, SOME PROBLEMS or EQUITY (1950).

Equity jurisdiction technically equals the reasons for coming into equity.
A justiciable dispute can be present, but what the court does depends on its
exercise of power. Id. at 306. The exercise of jurisdiction "... is simply
a bundle of sound principles of decision, delimiting the judge's duty but not
his power". Id. at 303.
27 The Civil Practice Act expresses an intent that common law should
apply in the absence of coverage in the Act. Section 1 provides:
The provisions of this Act apply to all civil proceedings, both at law and
in equity, .... As to matters not regulated by statute or rule of court,
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Inadequacy of the Legal Remedy as a Requisite of
Equity Jurisdiction
The condition precedent of showing an equitable basis often
creates an insurmountable barrier for defrauded consumers and
their need for an expeditious remedy. In the typical consumer
fraud situation, numerous consumers desire recovery of their
losses and seek the legal remedy of damages.2 8 Fraud, such as
perpetrated on them, can be a proper equitable basis. 29

How-

ever, it is well settled that where an adequate remedy at law
exists (i.e., damages), equity jurisdiction will not be invoked.3 0
Thus, some Illinois courts have held that a class action based on
fraud, seeking damages as its sole remedy, is a case at law and
31
will not lie.

A consumer class action based on fraud and seeking solely
damages would appear to have a proper equitable basis notthe practice at common law and in equity prevails.
ILL. REv.
STAT. ch. 110, §1 (1969).
28

E.g., where a consumer is deceived into buying a product through
deceptive
advertising.
29
See generally Starrs, Part I.
30 See Johnson v. North Am. Life, 100 Ill. App. 2d 212, 241 N.E.2d 332
(1968). Equity jurisdiction may be invoked when trusts are involved. This
is peculiar to equity and jurisdiction is not denied on the basis of an adequate
remedy at law.
An entire absence of a remedy at law is not necessary but the inadequacy
and impracticability of the remedy is equally effective to furnish a
ground for equity jurisdiction. The jurisdiction of equity for the enforcement of trusts is another ground ....

The enforcement of trusts

is peculiarly within the province of a court of equity, and a case which
has for its object the enforcement of a trust is a case in equity. Equitable
jurisdiction is not taken away by the fact that the complainant has a
remedy at law.
Flanagan v. City of Chicago, 311 Il1. App. 135, 158, 35 N.E.2d 545, 555
(1941). See text between notes 94 and 136, infra, for a discussion of trusts
and class actions. See generally POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE, §§216-22
(5th ed. 1941) ; Starrs, Part 1, 224-26.
81 Fetherston v. Nat'l Republic Bancorporation, 280 Ill. App. 151 (1935),
discussed between notes 35 and 43 infra; Langson v. Goldberg, 373 Ill. 297,
26 N.E.2d 111 (1940); the court in People ex rel. Aramburu v. City of
Chicago, 73 Ill. App. 2d 184, 219 N.E.2d 548 (1966) stated:
Inasmuch as the nature of class representation is essentially equitable,
the representative party being regarded as a quasi-trustee for the represented parties, the use of the class representation technique is limited to
court of chancery and there can be no class or representative suits in law
actions....
Id. at 194, 219 N.E.2d at 553. The court held that mandamus cannot be
brought as a class action in Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Schreiber, 382 11. 454,
47 N.E.2d 462 (1943) where it stated: "Mandamus is a law action in which
representative suits are unknown." Id. at 459, 47 N.E.2d at 464. Likewise,
a defendant class action is a case unique to the equity side of the court.
See Arthur Rubloff & Co. v. Leaf, 347 Ill. App. 191, 196, 106 N.E.2d 735,
737 (a damage class action against defendant in representative capacity
for all holders and owners of capital stock of a corporation). Chafee remarks:
Suits of a legal nature to recover damages for or against a class of
unnamed persons are a recent development, although representative suits
involving money claims were adjudicated in equity as a matter of course
, . * and courts were long inclined to keep them there.
Z. CHAFEE, SOME PROBLEMS OF EQUITY, 285-86 (1950). Chafee went on to
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withstanding the strong influence of this historical equitable
rule.2 First, the remedy at law is grossly inadequate to the defrauded consumer. An inadequate remedy at law has been defined to be one " . . . not so speedy, practical, and efficient to the
ends of justice and its prompt administration as the remedy in
equity. ''13 Moreover, one of the grounds advanced as rendering
the legal remedy inadequate is that a multiplicity of actions
would be necessary at law. Second, in light of the jurisdictional
merger of law and equity in Illinois, if a class action is filed
on the equity side of a Circuit Court and it develops that there
is an adequate remedy at law, no dismissal should follow since
the Circuit Court under its merged powers may give relief called
for by the issues.34 Both of these reasons would appear to make
a consumer class action based on fraud and seeking solely damages attractive for equitable adjudication. However, the Illinois
courts' apparent inclination to keep the class action in equity
as well as their strict construction of equitable rules have led
to the opposite result.
The 1935 case of Fetherston v. National Republic Ban3 5
corporation
illustrates the courts' inclination to keep class actions in equity, the strict construction of equitable rules, and
the affect of a disallowance of the class action on the small
claimant consumer.
The plaintiff filed a class action alleging, among other
grounds, that the defendant holding bank fraudulently conspired
to induce depositors to deposit their money.36 Millions of dollars
were subsequently lost by depositors. The plaintiffs contended
that the corporation, officers, and directors participating in the
conspiracy should be held accountable for their acts and made to
respond in damages for the losses sustained. The Illinois Apsay that a jury could encounter much difficulty with the complexities involved
in multi-party situations as well as the difficulties met regarding the collection
of the money judgment through the judicial machinery of the law courts.
[Ilt would be silly today to insist on excluding class suits for damages
altogether." Id.
32 See note 30 supra.
33 W. FUNIAK, HANDBOOK

OF MODERN EQUITY 31 (2d ed. 1956).
A
damage suit should be considered by the court as equitable by nature since
the issues are so complex that a jury trial is inadequate. Z. CIIAFEE, SOME

PROBLEMS
OF EQUITY, 286 (1950). Note 30 supra.
34
At most, the representatives would be required to amend their complaint to ask for the legal relief which the court determined to be available

and adequate. If the class action sounds in equity, a legal matter which is
joined may be heard by the same court since equity has ancillary jurisdiction over legal matters collateral to the main equitable issue. Supreme Court

Rule 232 also notes this. ILL REV.

STAT.,

110A §232 (1969).

Ill. App. 151 (1935).
36 The plaintiffs charged that it was fraud upon them and the other
depositors to advertise that the outlying banks were affiliated with an
institution whose combined resources were in excess of $250,000,000.00 and
that the false advertisements and publications were the result of a conspiracy.
35280
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pellate Court affirmed the lower court's dismissal of the action
and stated:
It is in the nature of an action for deceit. The rule in equity
pleading allowing representative suits where the parties are numerous has no application .

. .

. Representative, or class suits, are

allowed only where the question is of a common or general interest,
where one sues for the benefit of the whole ....

We find no cases

deciding that mere numerousness of parties alone will confer jurisdiction upon a7 court of equity in a case that is properly cognizable at law.3

The court cited with approval the New York Federal District Court case of Michelson v. Penney,8 which held in response to defendant's contention that the depositors were numerous and common questions of law and fact were present, that:
. . . these considerations do not justify the casting of many actions

at law for deceit into one suit in equity, nor do they permit some
of the allegedly defrauded depositors to bring a class or representative suit in behalf of all.39

The reason for the court's disallowance of the class action
is not easily extracted from the opinion. The court felt it was
"obvious' 4 0 that the complaint should fail because, if the plaintiff
lost, this "failure could not bind another depositor who could
establish all the elements necessary to maintain successfully an
action of deceit."' 4 By this, the court appeared concerned with
protecting the interests of the depositors not before the court.
However, equity is known to be flexible in its approach to such
problems and usually balances the considerations of convenience
and fairness in arriving at its determination.2
Furthermore,
these considerations created the class action in the first instance
37 Fetherston v. Nat'l Republic Bancorporation, 282 Ill. App. 151, 160

(1935). The use of the word jurisdiction by the court was proper since the
opinion was written before the 1964 Judicial Article. See text between notes

20 and 26 supra.
8810 F. Supp. 537 (S.D.N.Y. 1934).
39 Id. at 540. Similar facts were involved. The plaintiffs charged that
the bank remained open almost three years while insolvent. The court in
Michelsen also stated that there was an adequate remedy at law and that

the defendant may not be deprived of his right to a trial by jury:
There is no escape from the conclusion that the class action for false
representations made to depositors is essentially one for which there is

an adequate remedy at law and therefore is not of equitable cognizance.
Id.
40 Fetherston v. Nat'l Republic Bancorporation, 280 Ill. App. 151, 161
(1935).
41Id. at 162.
42
Historically, class suits began because of their convenience, and
convenience remains the chief factor for determining their desirability.
But even though the suit is convenient, it is not always just to bind
members of the class in their absence. The question whether this is

just or not should be decided by considerations of fairness, the probable

operation of the particular suit, the possibility of safeguards, and the
fruits of judicial experience. It ought not be decided by technical
rules....

(1950).
23. Such considerations are embodied in Rule 23.

Z. CHAFEE, SOME PROBLEMS OF EQUITY, 280

Accord, FED. R. CIr. P.
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and continued to guide its development and application to new
situations. The Illinois consumer, by virtue of such "precedent,"
is often confined to the "law" side of the court, as his request
for damages to remedy the fraudulent acts of the defendant will
not satisfy a rigid and technical application of equitable rules. 4
In most consumer fraud situations there is a common question of law or fact involved, since usually each victim will have
been defrauded by the same person, or in the same transaction,
or in a series of similar transactions.44 In such situations there
is more than "mere numerousness of parties," 4" and as in Fetherston, the common origin of the fraud would be the common ques4
tion of law or fact. 6
As indicated, 7 equity will only assume jurisdiction where
the legal remedy of damages is inadequate and the complaint
seeks an equitable remedy. Except for recent indications of
a departure from the restrictive interpretation and application
of equitable rules and precedents, '4 the successful maintenance

of a class action in Illinois has been considered only in cases
involving the equitable remedies of accounting, declaratory
judgments, declaration of constructive trusts, injunctions, and
restitution. 49 It follows that if a consumer files a class action
based on fraud, and seeks damages as his sole remedy, a con4 Since it is unlikely that consumers will proceed individually at "law",
the disallowance of a class action in "equity" will leave many consumers
remediless as well as leaving an open invitation to the dishonest. See
generally
sources cited in notes 2 and 3 supra.
44
E.g., Fetherston v. Nat'l Republic Bancorporation, 280 Ill. App. 151
(1935), see text between notes 35 and 43 supra; Kimbrough v. Parker, 344
Ill. App. 483 101 N.E.2d 617 (1952) involving a fraudulent puzzle contest;
Holstein v. Montgomery Ward & o., 3 CCH Pov. L. REP. 9656, (No.
68 CH 275 Cir. Ct. of Cook County, Ill. March 11, 1969) involving deceptive
merchandising with respect to a negative enrollment insurance policy.
45See Fetherstonquote, text at note 37 supra.
46 See note 36 upra. For a discussion of class actions that were held
maintainable on the basis of the conspiratorial nature of the plaintiff's
charges, see text between notes 120 and 128 infra.
The ideal situation for a representative suit is one in which the resemblances among members of the class are strong and the differences
among them is slight. The members can be regarded as merged in the
class. The main question concerns the class. There may also be questions inside the membership, but they are minor and can be laid on the
shelf for the time being.
Z. CHAFEE,

SOME PROBLEMS OF EQUITY 208

(1950)

(Emphasis added.)

"The social interest in suppression of commercial deception should, however,
override the brittle logic of this legalistic paradox." Dole, Merchant &
Consumer Protection: The Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act, 76 YALE
L.J. 485,
500 (1967).
7
See note 30 and accompanying text supra.
48 On the theory of constructive trust, the "common fund" class action
has been permitted by the Illinois courts. This enables the class members
to receive, in effect, damages for the fraudulent wrongdoings. See note 30
supra for authority on the exercise of equitable jurisdiction when a trust is
involved, and text between notes 87 and 148 infra for discussion of the
"common fund" class action in Illinois.
49 Typical factual situations employing equitable remedies are: taxpayers' suits to enjoin the collection of illegally levied taxes, People v. Clark,
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servative court will not exercise its equitable jurisdiction and
the case will be dismissed. If on the other hand the consumer
seeks an injunction or restitution for the same wrongdoing, he
will have satisfied the equitable rules and precedents and, as

to that class action requirement, the court will exercise jurisdiction.5 0 This distinction, based on the relief requested, while
it treats what appear to be practical equivalents, is perhaps
explained in part by certain due process of law considerations.
THE REQUIREMENT OF DUE PROCESS OF LAW

One of the distinguishing characteristics of class actions is
that all members of the class are bound by the decree.5 1 Normally one is not bound by a judgment or decree in a litigation
in which he is not designated a party and before the court or
52
to which he has not been made a party by service of process.

A judgment rendered under such circumstances is not entitled
to full faith and credit. 3 To this general rule there is the exception that the judgment in a class action, to which some members of the class are named and before the court, may bind class
members who are named and absent. 54 To insure the proper
adjudication of absent interests, the concept of due process in
296 Ill. 46, 129 N.E. 583 (1920); Knopf v. First Nat'l Bank, 173 Ill. 331,
50 N.E. 660 (1898); Harrison Sheet Steel Co. v. Lyons, 15 Ill. 2d 532,
155 N.E.2d 595 (1959) ; suits of bank creditors to enforce the constitutional
liability of bank stockholders to creditors, Leonard v. Bye, 361 Ill. 185, 197
N.E. 546 (1935); Babka Plastering Co. v. City State Bank, 264 Ill. App.
142 (1931); suits by members of a voluntary association to restrain the
enforcement of a void by-law, City of Chicago v. Collins, 175 Ill. 445, 51 N.E.
907 (1898); People ex rel. Furlong v. Election Comm'rs, 404 Ill. 326, 88
N.E.2d 864 (1949); suits to compel the restoration of funds or property
diverted by officers of a voluntary association or a corporation, Guilfoil v.
Arthur, 158 Ill. 600, 41 N.E. 1009 (1895) ; Bayci v. Rango, 304 Ill. App.
203, 25 N.E.2d 1015 (1940) ; Snyder v. Autna Constr. Co., 272 Ill. App. 591
(1933); suits by property owners to obtain an accounting of unexpended
funds collected for the purpose of building or maintaining a public improvement, Flanagan v. City of Chicago, 311 Ill. App. 135, 35 N.E.2d 545
(1941).
50 However, equitable relief may not be sufficiently attractive to consumers who wish to recover damages. Coupled with the difficulties of proving a "common fund" (text between notes 87 and 136 supra), many types
of consumer fraud and deception will not be amenable to class action relief
in Illinois. Equity can, however, award damages as an incident to equitable
relief, under the theory of ancillary jurisdiction or retention of jurisdiction
to settle all claims. See Texas Co. v. Hollingsworth 376 Ill. 536 31 N.E.2d
944, 947 (1941); Venturelli v. Trovero, 346 Ill. Ajp. 429, 105 NE.2d 306
(1952); Illinois Minerals Co. v. Miller, 327 Ill. App. 596, 65 N.E.2d 44
(1946 ; Indus. Natural Gas Co. v. Sunflower Natural Gasoline Co., 330 Ill.
App. 343, 71 N.E.2d 199 (1947). For an excellent discussion of the advantages of equity jurisdiction, including its vast enforcement techniques, see
generally Starrs, Part I.

See also, J.

POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE

§§68-88 (5th ed. 1941).
52 See generally Story's discussion of the principles underlying class
actions as stated in South E. Nat'l Bank v. Bd. of Educ., 298 Ill. App. 92,
115-24. (1938).
52 Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 40 (1940).
58/d.

54Id. at 41. See Hartford Life Ins. Co. v. Barber, 245 U.S. 146 (1917);
Supreme Tribe of Ben Hur v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 356 (1921).
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the state and federal constitutions requires that a party shall
not be bound in the litigation unless the requirements of notice,
personal jurisdiction and adequacy of representation are satis-

fied.

55

. he Supreme Court of the United States in Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank and Trust Company"8 held that:
An elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in any
proceeding which is to be accorded finality is notice reasonably
calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties

of the pendency of the action
and afford them an opportunity to
57
present their objections.
The Illinois Supreme Court has reiterated this requirement
in Otto v. Alexander5 and said that where some of the parties
were parties by representation only, failure to give notice was
a denial of due process of law and in violation of the fourteenth
amendment. 59 The Otto Court quoted from Hansberry v. Lee,'1
where the Supreme Court stated:
Because of the dual and potentially conflicting interests of those
who are putative parties to the agreement in compelling or resisting its performance, it is impossible to say, solely because they
are parties to it, that any two of them are of the same class. Nor
without more, and with the due regard for the protection of the
rights of absent parties which due process exacts, can some be
permitted to stand in judgment for all. 6 1

The notice necessary to satisfy due process can present a
problem for the court, but a decision on how to effectuate it can
be postponed until the propriety of the action is determined.2
55 Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940).
56 339 U.S. 306 (1949).
57 Id. at 314. See also Millikin v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457 (1940) ; Grannis
v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385 (1914); Western Life Indem. Co. v. Rupp, 235 U.S.
261 (1914).
58 383 Ill. 482, 50 N.E.2d 511 (1943).
This was a suit by four owners
of lots in a subdivision for themselves and others similarly situated. The
F laintiffs sought to cancel certain restrictive covenants in the deeds to the
ts. The plaintiffs attempted service on all class members of the pendency
of the suit however, only a portion actually were served. The plaintiffs
contended that the attempted service was effective.
59 Id.

60 311 U.S. 32 (1940),
r'ev'g Hansberry v. Lee, 372 Ill. 369, 24 N.E.2d
37 (1939).
61 Otto v. Alexander, 383 Ill. 482, 488, 50 N.E.2d 511, 513 (1943),
citing Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 44 (1940).
62 See Holstein v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 3 CCH Pov. L. REP.
9656
(No. 68 CH 275 Cir. Ct. Cook County, Ill. March 11, 1969), where the
court looked to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 and the underlying
federal decisions for guidance on the problem of notice to class members.
See text between notes 137 and 147, inf!ra. See also Eisen v. Carlisle &
Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555 (2d Cir. 1968) ; Booth v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 264
F. Supp. 465, 472 (N.D. Ill. 1967), a taxpayer's suit in which the court held
that due process would be satisfied with notice by publication in a situation
where properly identifying several hundred thousand taxpayers would require more than reasonable effort. Ward, Jr., The Contents and Mechanics
of Rule 28 Notice, 10 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REV. 557 (1969); Comment, Constitutional and Statutor'y Requirements of Notice Under Rule 23(c)(2), 10
B.C. IND. & COM. L. REV. 571 (1969).
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Adequacy of Representation
In addition to notice and an opportunity to be heard, due
process of law has been held to require adequate representation
of all class members.63 This essential was enunciated by the
Supreme Court of the United States in the landmark cfse of
Hansberry v. Lee.64 The decision enabled class action to have
a binding effect on all members of the class while meeting with
5
the requirements of due process of law.6

The plaintiffs in Hansberry contended that a prior decree
bound the defendants as class members to a judgment uphold-

ing the validity of certain racial covenants. The Supreme Court
held that defendants were not bound by the prior class action because the defendants' interests had not been adequately represented.6 6 The Court held that a class action can constitutionally

bind members of a class only when (1) the plaintiff is a member
of the class which he purports to represent and (2) the plaintiff
67
in fact adequately represents absent members of the class.

In summarizing Hansberry, Professor Moore states that,
"In order for a party adequately to represent a class, his inter-

ests must be wholly compatible with and not antagonistic to
those whom he would represent."68
Hansberry did not dictate a strict rule regarding class actions but only indicated the protection of interests of absent
parties who are to be bound by the decree must be "fairly in-

sured."

What the Hansberry Court meant by "fairly insured"

was passed upon by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in the
case of Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin.69 To "fairly insure" the

interests of absent members of the class, the court said there
63 Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940).

64id., rev'g Hansberry v. Lee, 372 Ill. 369, 24 N.E.2d 37 (1939). See
Comment, ConstitutionalLaw - Res Judicata- Class Suits - Dus Process,
21 B.U.L. REV. 132 (1941); Comment, ConstitutionalLaw; ProceduralDue
Process; Application to Class Suits, 26 CORNELL L.Q. 317 (1941); Comment,
ConstitutionalLaw - Due Process of Law Under Fourteenth Amendment Res Judicata- Class Suits, 26 WASH. U.L.Q. 422 (1941).
65 This is, of course, subject to the due process limitations.
66 The persons seeking to enforce the covenant were not in the same class
as those resisting performance and the lack of a sufficient identity of interest between the representatives and the absent class members was violative
of due process. This violation of due process resulted from Illinois' failure
to properly apply the due process requirements. Illinois' reaction to this
landmark decision was a restrictive application of class action rules. E.g.,
Newberry Library v. Bd. of Educ 387 Ill. 85, 55 N.E.2d 147 (1944), discussed in text between notes 81 and 87 inf a. Chafee queries: "Could there
have been two classes in Hansberry v. Lee one seeking to uphold the restriction and the other to make it inapplicable to a proposed use of lots in
the tract?" Z. CHAFEE, SOME PROBLEMS OF EQUITY, 237 (1950). Compare
Chafee's comments with Cook v. Cohn, 25 Ill. App. 2d 30, 166 N.E.2d 614
(1960), where the court upheld the class action as to only part of the class.
See text between notes 94 and 99 infra.
67 Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 42-44 (1940).
8
6 3A MOORE,FEDERAL PRACTICE, 123.07[3] (2d ed. 1967).
6 391 F.2d 555 (2d Cir. 1968).
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must be (1) no hostility of interests, and (2) a qualitative adeThe court relied on Hansberry in sup-

quacy of representation."

port of its first requirement:
[I]t is necessary to eliminate so far as possible the likelihood
that the litigants are involved in a collusive suit or that the plaintiff has interests antagonistic to those of the remainder of the
class. 71
The Eisen court stressed adequacy of representation as a

qualitative not quantitative test:
.. . [W]e believe that reliance on quantitative elements to determine adequacy of representation, as was done by the District
Court, is unwarranted. If class suits could only be maintained in
the useinstances where all or a majority of the class appeared,
72
fulness of the procedure would be severely curtailed.

The important concern for the court is whether there is
sufficient similarity between the position of the representatives
and the absent class members to assure that all the necessary
arguments in behalf of the entire class are before the court. 73
Adequacy of representation is one of the most important, if not
the most important, ingredient in any class action determination
by the court. The handling of class actions by many Illinois
74
courts appears greatly controlled by this due process element.
The Requirement of a Community of Interest In the
Subject Matter and the Remedy
While the class action device is firmly established in Illinois
case law, there is considerable disagreement as to when the device may be used. 75 To pass on the propriety of a class action,
TOId. at 562-63.
71 Id. at 562.

2Id. at 563.

Adequacy of representation is a question of fact, to be raised and resolved in the trial court .

.

. and assertions in defendants' brief in

this court are ineffectual to make a factual issue on plaintiffs' allegation of ability to protect the interest of the class, much less to disprove
them.
Harris v. Palm Springs Alpine Estate, 329 F.2d 909, 914 (9th Cir. 1964).
See also, Warner v. First Nat'l Bank, 236 F.2d 853, 858 (8th Cir. 1956);
Ford, Federal Rule 23: A Device for Aiding the Small Claimant, 10 B.C. &
COM. L. REV. 501, 509-10 (1969).
7 See generally Ford, Federal Rule 23: A Device for Aiding the Small
Claimant, 10 B.C. & COM. L. REv. 501, 509-10 (1969); Starrs, Part II
499-500; Moore & Cohn, Federal Class Actions, 32 ILL. L. REV. 307 (1937) ;
Gordon, The Common Question Class Suit Under the Federal Rules and in
Illinois, 42 ILL. L. REV. 518 (1947).
74Aside from Section 52.1 of the Civil Practice Act, which controls
compromise and dismissal of a class action, the due process requirement is
the only present restriction on the Illinois courts. It appears that some
Illinois courts over-reacted to the due process requirements as stated by the
Court in Hansberr'y. E.g., Newberry Library v. Bd. of Educ., 387 Ill. 85,
55 N.E.2d 147 (1944), discussed in text between notes 81 and 87 infra.
75 Two questions that arise concern (1) the necessary degree of unity
of interest between representatives and the absent class members sufficient
to constitute the members as a class, and (2) whether a class action can be
maintained at "law." For examples of the types of factual situations class
actions have been used in, see note 49 supra.
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the court must examine the facts involved to determine how
unified in interest the representatives and absent members are.
The mere fact that there are numerous defrauded consumers
seeking redress is in itself insufficient to involve the court's jurisdiction.16 Moreover, a class action cannot be maintained merely
because it is designated as such in the pleadings. 7 There must
be a sufficient degree of unity between all class members, present
and absent, which will insure adequacy of representation and in
turn satisfy the demands of due process of law.
In Illinois, the successful maintenance of a class action requires all members of the class to have a community of interest
in the subject matter and the remedy.7 8 In other words, there
can be no adequate representation sufficient to meet with due
process of law unless there is a community of interest in the
subject matter of the litigation and in the remedy sought. As
to what constitutes a "community of interest," the courts have
taken divergent views. The liberal interpretation of "community
of interest" would permit a consumer class action based on fraud
because the separate rights of the individual consumers usually
arise from a common source (i.e., the fraudulent wrongdoing.)
On the other hand, a conservative interpretation and application
of "community of interest" would seem to exclude the action
based on fraud, since the inherent factual variants of damages,
defenses and reliance7 would create a multi-faceted claim against
the defendant. The Illinois decisions have taken both positions;
at times in very similar factual situations8 °
The remainder of this comment will concern itself with the
requirement of a "community of interest" as interpreted and applied by the Illinois courts.
76 Accord, Fetherston v. Nat'l Republic Bancorporation, 280 Ill. App.
151,160 (1935).
77 Oppenheimer v. Cassidy, 345 Il1. App. 212, 102 N.E.2d 678, 682
(1952). There appears to be no formal language required to state a class
action in the pleadings, however, the representatives must state facts sufficient to meet the general requirements of (1) equity jurisdiction, (2) due
process, and (3) a community of interest in the subject matter and the
remedy. These would appear to be the minimum requirements in pleading
the class action.
78 For a statement of the general requirements, see Moseid v. McDonough, 103 Ill. App. 2d 23, 243 N.E.2d 394 (1968), discussed in note 132
infra.
79

The elements of a cause of action for misrepresentation are that (1)

there be a misrepresentation of material fact, (2) with knowledge of its
falsity or reckless disregard for its truth or falsity, (3) to a party with the
intention that he rely on it, and (4) that the believing party does so rely,
(5) with resultant damages. Bergman & Lefkow Ins. Agency v. Flash Cab
Co., 110 Ill. App. 2d 415, 429, 249 N.E.2d 729, 736 (1969).
80 Compaire Harrison Sheet Steel Co. v. Lyons, 15 Ill. 2d 532, 155 N.E.2d
595 (1959) with Peoples Store v. McKibbin, 379 Ill. 148, 39 N.E.2d 995
(1942). See text between notes 109 and 117 inf'a.

1971]

Consumer Class Actions

Distinct Transactionswith the Defendant as Affecting
"Community of Interest"
The fact that each member of the class had contact with
the defendant in distinct transactions may destroy the required
"community of interest" in the subject matter of the litigation.
Four years after the United States Supreme Court's decision in
Hansberry v. Lee,81 came the Illinois Supreme Court's decision
in Newberry Library v. Board of Education.2 The Newberry
Library representatives sought to recover on refunding bonds
issued by the defendant. The issue was whether a pending suit,
83
was a proper class action in
Delevitt v. Board of Education,
behalf of all holders of bonds issued by the defendant. If Delevitt was such a class action, then Newberry Library's action
would be dismissed since another action was pending between
the same parties for the same cause. Defendant contended that
plaintiffs were proper parties by representation in Delevitt and
therefore were being afforded due process of law under the state
federal constitutions. The supreme court held that Delevitt
was not a proper class action because the bonds, although issued
simultaneously and identical in terms, were nonetheless purchased in separate and distinct transactions by each holder and
that there was not a sufficient joint or common interest in the
subject matter to constitute the holders as a class.8 4 Thus, it
would be violative of due process to hold Newberry Library's
right adjudicated in the Delevitt action. The court in Newberry
Library would preclude the typical consumer class action based
81311 U.S. 32 (1940).
82 387 Ill.
85, 55 N.E.2d 147 (1944).
83 At the time of the appeal, Delevitt was pending in the Circuit Court.
In Delevitt, the plaintiff alleged that he was the owner and holder of a bond
and that the board of education refused to pay interest on a coupon attached
thereto on the ground that the attached coupons were invalid. The complaint
in Delevitt prayed a decree on behalf of the plaintiff and all other owners
and holders of the bonds and coupons, for judgment of the amount of interest
due, together with costs and attorney fees.
84 Newberry Library v. Bd. of Educ., 387 Il1. 85, 96, 97, 55 N.E.2d 147,
153 (1944). The court stated:
• . . [W]hile it is true that Delevitt and appellants were all owners of
bonds of the same issue, and all were equally interested in the recovery
of coupon No. 16 attached to their respective bonds, yet the purchase of
bonds by each was a transaction separate and distinct from that of
purchase of bonds by the others. There was no joint action or interest
in such purchases. In the Delevitt case the plaintiff's sole interest was
to recover the amount due upon his coupon No. 16. No other owner or
holder of any of the remaining coupons No. 16 joined as party plaintiff
in the suit. If it be held under these circumstances that the Delevitt
suit is a class or representative suit, and that all owners of coupons No.
16 are to be bound by any order, judgment or decree entered in that suit,
then, if a defense of payment, settlement of claim, or any other defense
has been made and found good as to Delevitt's coupon, resulting in an
order or judgment against him, all members of the class must logically
be bound by the order of dismissal and their cause of action disposed of
without any of them having an opportunity to be heard.
Id. at 96-97, 55 N.E.2d at 153.
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on fraud since each transaction with the defendant would be
considered separate and distinct and thus insufficient to constitute the consumers as a class.8 5 One writer has viewed this
decision "as a reaction to the due process implications of Hansberry."8 , Another has viewed it "as part of a larger pattern of
dislike and suspicion toward this type of class action that has
marked the attitude of the Illinois court in recent years."8 '
A determination by the court of the factual circumstances
surrounding each class member's claim may also destroy the
requisite "community of interest." This was the holding in
Kuehn v. Bismarck Hotel Co., 88 where six former employees of

the defendant hotel brought suit in a representative capacity
seeking declaratory and other relief as a result of an alleged
discharge without cause resulting in exclusion from a pension
trust. While the court emphasized that "there must be a community of interest not only in the subject matter of the dispute,
but also in the remedy,8 9 the opinion does not reveal any factual
issues requiring the application of the emphasized portion of the
rule.90 In holding the class action improper, the court noted the
failure of the complaint in not presenting any factual or legal
questions common to the class. "1 The court stated that "[e]ach
discharge would have to be examined by the court in the light of
its own peculiar and individual fact situation. 9' 2 The trust
agreement would seem to present the common question, but the
85 The court in Newberry Library would restrict the use of class actions
to those cases where each class member stands in an identical position with
respect to a claimed right. The court stated:
Members of a class may represent others of that class where the sole and
common interest of the entire class is to assert or challenge a claimed
right; but where the substantial interests of parties present in such a
suit are not necessarily or even probably the same as the interests of
those they seek to represent, such parties present cannot be said to
afford that protection to absent parties required by due process.
Newberry Library v. Bd. of Educ., 387 Ill. 85, 96, 55 N.E.2d 147, 153
(1944). In applying these rules to the Newberry Library facts, it appears
the court is saying that the Delevitt class members have insubstantial interests. However, the class members were all owners of bonds of the same
issue and were all interested in the recovery of the coupon value. The mere
fact that each bond was purchased in a separate and distinct transaction
seems to have led the court to conclude that there was no common interest.
86 Starrs, PartII at 428.
87 Gordon, The Common Question Class Suit Under the Federal Rules
and in Illinois, 42 ILL. L. REv. 518, 530 (1947).
88 52 Ill. App. 2d 321, 202 N.E.2d 52 (1964).
89 Id. at 325, 202 N.E.2d at 55.
(Emphasis added.)
90 Predicated on uncontroverted affidavits of the defendant, the court did
conclude that " . . . t]he allegations of count one, alleging a plan by the

Bismarck to summarily dismiss employees . . . is wholly unfounded as to

these four plaintiffs." Id. at 324, 202 N.E.2d at 54. The court stated that
the four plaintiffs had a vested interest in the pension trust, but the four
plaintiffs as well as the other two alleged they were excluded wrongfully
and sought declaratory relief.
91 Id. at 325, 202 N.E.2d at 55.
921d.
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court simply refused to entertain the class action without alluding to that possibility. 3
The Common Fund Class Action
The community of interest in the subject matter of the suit
can most easily be met by the class members having a joint interest in a fund, trust, or other property.9 4 In Cook v. Cohn,95

defendant's retail customers filed a class action seeking to obtain
a refund of a sales tax paid on their purchases of carpeting. The
tax was declared invalid and the class sought to establish a con-

structive trust on the refund paid to the defendant by the state.9 6
In its determination, the court distinguished between two groups
of purchasers within the class: those who had paid their bill
without the tax being itemized, and those who had paid the tax
as a separate item on their bill 97 . The court permitted the action
by the purchasers who had paid the tax separately and held
the lower court erred in extending the reach of the plaintiff's
class action to those customers who had paid the tax as a part
of the purchase price. 8 Although the rationale for the distinction between the two groups is by no means clearly set forth, it
appears the court felt the itemization necessary to the holding
of defendant as a constructive trustee for the funds. In any
event, the court permitted the class action in part and in treating
93 This court, as well as the court in Newberry Library, would preclude
practically all class actions where members were not in identical positions.
94 "The Illinois decisions have since relaxed somewhat the requirements
for the use of class actions, at least where the relief requested . . . must
come from a . . . 'common fund'." Starrs, Part II at 430.
95 25 Ill. App. 2d 330, 166 N.E.2d 614 (1960).
96 The court in Fowley v. Braden, 4 Ill.
2d 355, 122 N.E.2d 559 (1954)
stated:
Constructive trusts arise by operation of law from circumstances which
stamp the conduct of a person as unfair and wrongful and permit him
to take advantage of another. They are divided into two general classes.
One, where actual fraud is considered as equitable ground for raising the
trust, and the other, where the existence of a confidential relation and
the subsequent abuse of the confidence reposed are sufficient to establish the trust.
Id. at 361, N.E.2d at 563. See generally Kapraun v. Kapraun, 12 Ill. 2d
348, 146 N.E.2d 7 (1957); Mortell v. Beckman, 16 Ill.2d 209, 157 N.E.2d
63 (1959); Tarpoff v. Karandjeff, 51 Il. App. 2d 454, 201 N.E.2d 549
(1964); Williams v. Rock River Savings & Loan Ass'n, 51 Ill.
App. 2d 5, 200
N.E.2d 848 (1964).
97 25 Ill. A pp. 2d 330, 334, 166 N.E.2d 614, 616 (1960).
98 In
Smyth v. Kaspar American State Bank, 9 Ill.2d 27, 136 N.E.2d
796 (1956), the court permitted a class action to proceed by two groups of
bank certificate holders, one having refused to surrender their certificates
and the other having agreed to a redemption and surrender of their certificates. The Cook court distinguished Smyth and stated that "[ihe claims
do bear upon a common fund as in Smyth ... but it is clear that the claims
do not have a common basis as they did there." 25 Ill. App. 2d 330, 334,
166 N.E.2d 614, 616 (1960). While it appears that Cook and Smyth should
have been treated similarly, the court in Cook seemed to feel that it would
be burdensome and difficult to manage a class action if every "purchaser
of carpeting within the relevant dates would be entitled to a refund where
a tax was paid as a result of the purchase." Id. Compare the Cook court's
approach with Federal Rule 23.
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the refund as a "common fund," the court found a sufficient degree of unity between all class members with the itemization.99
Conflicting Interests of Class Members as Affecting
the Common Fund Class Action
The fact that class members have conflicting interests among
themselves does not destroy a community interest in the subject
matter where a common fund is involved. This was the point
of Smyth v. Kaspar American State Bank.100

There, two groups

of bank certificate holders, one having agreed to a redemption
and surrender of their certificates and the other having refused
to surrender their certificates, together filed a class action against
the defendant bank. 101 The court held the class action for injunctive relief proper even though the class included some who
sought recission for fraud in the surrender of their certificates.102
The court relied on a Federal Circuit Court of Appeals decision"',
which stated in part:
'The possible situation that the beneficiaries may have divergent
views as to their several undivided rights in the distribution of a
trust fund which is alleged to be insufficient
to pay all in full does
4
not prevent this being a class action.'1
The fact that the amount of each member's claim would be
different and that some members would be subject to an accord
99 While the court in Newberry Library did not mention the possibility
that a common fund would result from the interest on the coupons, it would
appear that the same factual situation could have led to a different result on
the theory of "common fund" or constructive trust. In the same type fact
situation, a different result was achieved in Fiorito v. Jones, 39 Ill. 2d 531,
236 N.E.2d 698 (1968). The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed a class action
procedure to hold unconstitutional amendments to the Service Occupation
Tax Act (ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, par. 439.101 et seq. 1967) and similar tax
acts. The court made it clear that there was a single class of taxpayers entitled to a refund of the unlawfully collected taxes; that the persons coming
within the class were those who bore the burden of the tax; that those who
bore the burden of the tax would be either the serviceman deemed taxable
by the amendatory acts or the purchaser from such serviceman; that the
plaintiffs properly represented the class entitled to refund in the action and
that all that remained was for the trial court to determine which servicemen
or purchasers had borne the burden of the tax and were entitled to a refund.
The only factor which was determinative of whether the purchaser was entitled to a refund was whether he bore the burden of the tax and not whether
he bore it as a separate item or so-called "hidden charge." The court in
Fiorito held that the purchaser who may have borne the tax as a "hidden
charge" was in the same class as the purchaser who bore it as a separate
charge and was properly represented by the plaintiffs.
100 9 Ill. 2d 27, 136 N.E.2d 796 (1956).
'01 The certificates were issued by defendant pursuant to a plan of reorganization. Under the agreement, depositors waived payment of a certain
percent of their accounts and accepted, in lieu thereof, certificates of beneficial
interest payable upon the written approval of the auditor.
102 The plaintiffs alleged that members of both groups have a preferential right to be paid pro rata the full face amount of their respective certificates before any dividends or returns are paid to the stockholders.
103 Redmond v. Commerce Trust Co., 144 F.2d 140 (8th Cir. 1944).
104 9 Ill. 2d 27, 45, 136 N.E.2d 796, 805 (1956).
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and satisfaction defense was held not to destroy the requisite
"community of interest" since the plaintiff showed:
a common interest in establishing the validity of the certificates
and the right of the holders to share in the net profits of the defendant bank in accordance with the terms of10 5 the certificates of
beneficial interest and the waiver agreement.
Smyth indicates that where a common thread runs through
the entire class action litigation, minor variants will not be violative of a class member's right to due process and prevent a
balancing in favor of the maintenance of the class action.1 06 As
indicated,'1 7 the crucial question, with respect to the degree of
unity required, is whether there is assurance of adequacy of rep-

resentation of absent class members.

If there is, then due

process will be satisfied and the class members will be bound by
res judicata.0s
The Dominant and Pervasive Issue
The common fund class action has been utilized by taxpayers' attempting to restrain state officials from transferring occupation taxes, paid under protest by retailers, into the state
treasury. Many suits were held not maintainable.19 However, in Harrison Sheet Steel Co. v. Lyons,1 ° the action was
allowed as a proper class action. The court found the requirement of a "community of interest" satisfied. The subject matter
was the refund to the customers and the remedy was a declaration of a constructive trust for the amounts to be transferred
into the state treasury."' The court rejected defendant's con105 Id.
106 The court stated that:

The mere fact that the pro rata share of a participant in a common fund
is increased or decreased by the number and amount of claims against
the fund does not constitute a conflict of interest between the claimants
which would bar a class suit to establish the fund.
9 Ill. 2d 27, 44, 136 N.E.2d 796, 805 (1956).
107 See text between notes 51 and 74 supra.
1os As indicated by the Supreme Court of the United States:
a procedure whereby some of the members of the class could stand
in judgment for all, provided that the procedure were so devised and applied as to insure that those present are of the same class as those absent

and that the litigation is so conducted as to insure the full and fair con-

sideration of the common issue . . . would satisfy the requirement of due
process of law. Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 43 (1940). See text
between notes 51 and 74 supra.
109 E.g., Peoples Store v. McKibbin, 379 Ill. 148, 39 N.E.2d 995 (1942)
Material Service Corp. v. McKibbin, 380 Ill. 226, 43 N.E.2d 939 (1942).
These actions were held not maintainable notwithstanding the members being
engaged in the same occupation and having a common interest in the remedy
sought (validity of a statute). Similar to the court in Newberry Library,
these courts found an absence of a community of interest since each claimant
was required to make his own showing of proof regarding his separate and
distinct transactions.
110 15 Ill. 2d 532, 155 N.E.2d 595 (1959).
11 The defendant received a refund of the tax wrongfully collected. See
definition of constructive trust, note 96 supra.
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tention that Peoples' Store of Roseland v. McKibbin,1112 was applicable and stated:
In that case, however, there was no common fund and the rights
of the members of the alleged class depended upon different factual
circumstances, to which different legal principles might be apthere is a common fund, and common factual and
plicable. Here
1 13
legal issues.

The court went on to say:
The company also contends that there is a possibility that indi-

vidual questions may arise between itself and the members of the
class. But the hypothetical existence of individual issues is not a
sufficient reason to deny the right to bring a class action. Where
it appears that the common issue is dominant and pervasive, someof a minor
thing more than the assertion of hypothetical variations
14
character should be required to bar the action.

Although the court in Harrisondid not overrule any earlier
Illinois decision which restrictively interpreted and applied the
community of interest requirement," r it did cast doubt on their
value as "precedent." Harrison permitted the class action to
proceed notwithstanding the separate showing of proof by each
member of his separate and distinct transactions with the defendant. 1 6 This court offers some hope for the maintenance of
many consumer class actions insofar as it speaks of a community
of interest, not in every issue of17 the controversy, but only the
"dominant and pervasive" issue.
There, a suit was brought to
112 379 Ill. 148, 39 N.E.2d 995 (1942).
enjoin such a collection and its denial was based on a lack of community of
interest. The sales for which the tax had been collected were of foodstuffs to
hospitals and other similar institutions. The complaint alleged that plaintiffs were a class on the theory that they were all individuals and firms
engaged in similar businesses. The court held that while all retailers of food
such sales
in having
commonstops
interest
from
have ainterest
institutions
supplies
the totax,
their common
there.
It is unclear
whatexempted
criteria
It appears
rule.
interest
of
community
the
applying
considers
the court
that
almost
identicalinissues,
between the class members and their adversaries,
are required.
113
15
Ill.
2d
532, 538,
155 N.E.2d
595, 598 (1959).
" Id.
(Emphasis
added.)
The court
went on to say:
will company's
The
not be impaired
opportunity
defend
anybeindividual
and ittocan
may
arise
hardly
said that issues
it will that
suffer
greater
inconvenience by litigating those issues in a single action instead of in
separate actions.
Id. On the contrary, it would appear that it would be more convenient and
over,
less expensive
the individual
for the
company
to settle
class
claims
members
wouldallhave
no in one litigation. More-

effective redress if they
would be required to proceed individually.
In a more recent decision, the
court permitted the plaintiffs' class action, attacking
the validity of the 1967
amendatory acts to Service Occupation and
Use Tax Acts, since the issues
of the validity of the 1967 amendments were
common to the class. The
differences between the members were not sufficient
to bar the action. Fiorito
v. Jones, 39 Ir. 2d 531, 236 N.E.2d 698 (1968).
See note 99 supra.
"5
None of the Illinois decisions involving class
actions have been overruled. More recent decisions, like Han
just
amon,distinguish the earlier
decisions on their
facts.
enCompare Harrison
with NewberOcu
aibriarna,
in text between notes 81
and 87
'. supra.
See note 46

supra.
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The Degree of Variation Permitted
The extent to which the Illinois courts have permitted varia-

tions between each class member and the defendant, where the
dominant and pervasive issue was common to the entire class,
is illustrated by the following cases, all involving the common
issue of fraud. 118 In each case equity jurisdiction was properly
exercised and the court rejected the defendant's attempt to defeat the action by contending that the elements of reliance and
damages had to be determined as to each member of the class and
therefore there could be no community of interest in the subject

matter of the litigation." 9
The case of Kruse v. Streamwood Utilities Corporation' °
was a class action in behalf of homeowners to have a constructive trust declared for their benefit of the distribution system of
Streamwood Utilities used in the rendering of sewer and water
service. In the alternative, the representatives requested a
damage award to represent the payments made by the homeowners for the distribution system. 121 The defendants, relying on
Langson v. Goldberg,'22 contended the action was improper because of the individual factual issues inherent where fraud was
involved. The court rejected their contention and stated that it
was not the factual variations which are of significance but
rather a "community of interest ... in questions of law and fact
involved in the general controversy.' 12 3 The court approved the
Illinois case of Wilkinson v. Heberling,124 where the court, over
similar contentions,125 allowed the action, since defendants were
charged with a conspiracy to defraud the plaintiffs. 1 2 The conspiratorial nature of the litigation enabled the court in Kruse
See note 79 supra.
119 In the area of shareholder securities fraud, the cases are similar to
consumer frauds and offer some support for a consumer class action for
damages based on fraud. In both situations there is a misrepresentation,
degrees of reliance and varying damages. The trend seems to favor the
class actions in the securities fraud area. See Note, Class Action Treatment
of Securities Fraud Suits Under the Revised Rule 23, 36 GEO. WASH. L.
Rav. 1150 (1968).
120 34 I1. App. 2d 100, 180 N.E.2d 731 (1962).
122 The class members allegedly suffered damages due to the unsanitary
condition of the water.
122 373 Ill. 297, 26 N.E.2d 111 (1940). There, the Illinois Supreme Court
said, "that an action for ... relief [predicated on fraudulent representations]
is personal to the person who suffered by the fraud and can not (sic) be
made the basis of a representative suit." Id. at 301, 26 N.E.2d at 113.
123 34 Ill. App. 2d 100, 108, 180 N.E.2d 731, 735 (1962).
124 231 Ill. App. 516 (1923).
There plaintiffs brought a suit based upon
fraudulent representations and the court permitted the class action to proceed since the defendants were charged with a conspiracy or concerted plan
to wrong and defraud the plaintiffs.
125 The defendants moved to dismiss on the ground that the suit was
multifarious and that courts of equity will not entertain complaints of that
nature merely to avoid a multiplicity of suits.
126 The court in Wilkinson quoted from Hale v. Allison, 188 U.S. 56
(1902):
218
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to find that members of the class shared a community of interest. Thus, the variant issues inherent in fraud did not override
the common question of conspiracy.
While Kruse and other recent Illinois decisions do not answer the question whether a class action can be maintained
solely for damages, it does indicate that the constructive trust or
common fund theory, as an equitable basis, may remedy many
consumer frauds. 127 These theories would be available in those
cases having the element of conspiracy or concerted action.
In Kimbrough v. Parker,128 five contestants in a fraudu1
29
lent
puzzle contest were permitted to maintain a class action
and impose a constructive trust upon proceeds of the amounts
collected. 130

The court permitted the action since:

There [was] a common fund from which contributions [were] to
be returned.

The contributions [were] of small amounts.

The

inducements were substantially the same for all contestants since
there were no personal solicitations. The issues between all contestants and defendants [were] the same. There [were] no actual or potential conflicts of interest. The five plaintiffs [were]
fairly representative and
have fairly represented contestants' side
2
of the common issues.' '

Again, the concept of constructive trust or common fund
enabled the court to find the requirement of a community of
interest in the subject matter and the remedy met. 32 While the
We are not disposed to deny that jurisdiction on the ground of preventing
a multiplicity of suits may be exercised in many cases in behalf of a
single complainant against a number of defendants, although there is no
common title nor community of rights or interest in the subject-matter
among such defendants, but where there is a community of interest
among them in the questions of law and fact involved in the general
controversy.
231 Ill. App. 516 (1923).
'27The class members' receipt of the proceeds of the common fund will
put them in status quo, and, in effect, allow them their "damages."
128 344 Ill. App. 483, 101 N.E.2d 617 (1951).
129 The contest was published in a newspaper and involved only ordinary
intelligence.
ISO The plaintiffs sought to impose a constructive trust on proceeds of
$230,000.00 collected from 3,300 contestants.
11344 Ill. App. 483, 486, 101 N.E.2d 617, 618 (1952).
(Emphasis
added.)
132 While the Illinois courts have not overruled earlier applications of
the community of interest rule, the strong influence of the "common fund"
class action has led recent courts to distinguish earlier decisions on the facts.
In Moseid v. McDonough, 103 Ill. App. 2d 23, 243 N.E.2d 394 (1968), the
court permitted a class action to challenge the validity of the Library Act of
1961 requiring a defendant in an action in Cook County to pay a $1.00 library
fee to the Cook County Court. The court relied on the existence of a common
fund, the fact that although the fee was paid in separate transactions the
circumstances were identical and raise the same issues of law and fact. The
remedy was common in that each plaintiff had an identical claim for a refund and the class sought a declaratory judgment to stop violations of the
Illinois Constitution not to be required to "purchase justice." The court
distinguished Newberry Library "since here there is a common origin of
claim, and a fund from which common recovery for the class may be had."
Id. at 29, 243 N.E.2d at 397. The court also distinguished People Stores
in that there was no fund in the fact situation. Id. at 28, 243 N.E.2d at 396.
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decision strongly supports the consumer fraud of deceptive advertising, 1 3 it does not lend support to those consumer frauds
in which there are personal dealings with each consumer thereby
creating varying inducements.1 3 4 However, the allowance of the
class action by Kimbrough permitted the class of defrauded consumers to receive, in effect, damages. This was permitted despite claims for varying amounts.1 3 5 In this respect the decision
is significant to prospects of a consumer class action. It is
indicative of a more liberal interpretation of the "community
of interest" requirement in situations involving fraud. This liberal approach is evident when one compares the Kimbrough decision to other Illinois decisions which plainly refused to con-

sider any such action. 1 0
A further indicator of Illinois' awareness of consumer needs
and the relaxation of the degree of "community of interest" required, is found in a recent decision in the Circuit Court of Cook
County. Holstein v. Montgomery Ward & Company'3 7 was a
consumer class action on behalf of approximately 6,000,000
Ward charge account holders against a credit-life, disability, and
dismemberment insurance plan. Ward sent out by third-class

mail, without return postage, a credit insurance certificate to its
charge account holders in virtually every state which would
permit the plan. This was accompanied by a solicitation urging

customers to take advantage of the plan and obliquely informing
them if they did not wish to do so, to notify Ward or they would
be contractually bound on the receipt of the insurance contract.
The next billing contained a reminder letter concerning the
1' Many of the frauds perpetrated upon the consumer occur through deceptive advertising where individual consumers are reached through the same
or similar newspaper advertisements. See, Dole, The Emergence of Deceptive Advertising as a Group Tort: A Possible Consequence of the 1966
Federal Rule Amendment with Respect to Class Actions, 62 Nw. U.L. REV.
661 (1967).
134 However, it would seem that if the representatives established the
existence of an underlying core of unlawful conduct affecting all class members, the settlement of all claims in one litigation would be advantageous to
both the class and the defendant.
'3 The Advisory Committee Note to new Federal Rule 23 states:
[A] fraud perpetrated on numerous persons by the use of similar misrepresentations may be an appealing situation for a class action, and
it may remain so despite the need, if liability is found, for separate
determination of the damages suffered by individuals within the class.
In Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555 (2d Cir. 1968), the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals stated that all of these differences among the class
members bear only on the computation of damages, a factor which, by itself,
does not justify dismissal of the class action. Id. at 566. The computation
of damages may be thought of as a matter of administrative detail. See
also Kronenberg v. Hotel Governor Clinton, Inc., 41 F.R.D. 42 (S.D.N.Y.
1966); City of Philadelphia v. Morton Salt Co., 248 F. Supp. 506 (E.D. Pa.
1965).
138 For a comparison of class actions in each state jurisdiction, see
Starrs, Part II, 425-96.
l1373 CCH Pov. L. REv. %9652 (No. 68 CH 275 Cir. Ct. Cook County,
March 11, 1969).
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merits of the plan and a statement that a customer could cancel
coverage if desired. The accompanying bill provided boxes
that could be checked depending on whether or not the customer
desired the insurance. If the customer did not desire the plan,
he had to deduct an indicated insurance premium already included in his monthly statement as well as check the "no" box.
Plaintiff Holstein, individually and in behalf of all other
charge account holders, filed a complaint for declaratory judgment for declaration of rights and other relief against Ward.
Deceptive merchandising was the gist of the plaintiff's allegations.' 8 Judge Nathan M. Cohen, of the Circuit Court of Cook
County, Illinois, denied the defendant's motion to dismiss the
plaintiff's third amended complaint. He ruled that the complaint
stated facts sufficient to sustain the class action notwithstanding
the defendant's contention that there:
is no such dominant and pervasive common issue, rather there

are a multitude of issues and interests produced by different factual situations and differing legal standards applicable to each of
the factual situations, which preclude a class action. 139

188 Plaintiff's third amended complaint contained four counts: COUNT
I: that Ward wrongfully imposed a burden upon the plaintiffs and all
other Charge-All account holders, to take affirmative action to avoid charges
for credit life, disability and dismemberment insurance and charges which
have been or are presently being levied against plaintiffs and all other
Charge-All account holders similarly situated; that plaintiff does not desire
such insurance and has not solicited such insurance in any way nor have
they authorized Ward to impose charges for services upon the monthly
statements sent to them. Ward has without authorization wrongfully collected monies for the insurance.
COUNT II: charges that Ward's actions as set forth in Count I were
done knowingly and that as to those Charge-All account holders who believed that they would specifically have to reject Charge-All insurance in
order to avoid being billed for them in subsequent statements received from
Ward, that Ward should have known that it was imposing the burden of
specific rejection upon such group and further that Ward knew or should
have known that such Charge-All account holders did not know that they
had to take such affirmative action. That plaintiff Allan and other group
plaintiffs undertook the expense of first class postage and mailing and the
time involved in order to reject this type of insurance.
COUNT III: that a new billing procedure about to be instituted by
Ward will continue to wrongfully impose a burden upon the plaintiff to
take affirmative action to avoid credit life and disability insurance and
premium charges which have been or are about to be levied against plaintiffs and other class members. Plaintiff contends a further burden will be
imposed on the class to take further affirmative action and incur further
inconvenience, expense and loss of time to avoid the insurance and premiums
charged for it. Plaintiff alleges that this is about to be done with knowledge
of its wrongful character, by defendant Ward and asks that preventive relief
be granted.
COUNT IV: that defendant Ward violated ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 121%,
§311-317, commonly known as the Deceptive Trade Practice Act. Id., Memorandum and Ruling on Defendant's Motion To Strike and Dismiss the Third
Amended Complaint and Ruling upon Plaintiff's Motion To Dismiss the
Defendant Montgomery Ward Life Insurance Company, at 2-4. (Hereinafter cited as Ruling.)
139 Holstein v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 3 CCH Pov. L. REv. 9652
(No. 68 CH 275 Cir. Ct. Cook County, March 11, 1969). Brief for Defendant
To Strike and Dismiss the Third Amended Complaint at 50. (Hereinafter

cited as Defendant's Biief.) See text between notes 88 and 93 supra.
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The court held that the "irritant of being covered by and/or
billed for insurance without first having affirmatively assented
14
thereto" was the "dominant and pervasive" issue."' 0
The court also rejected defendant-Ward's second contention supporting its motion to strike and dismiss. Defendant
contended that "many members of the class simply have nothing
to gain through this lawsuit: many others are directly
harmed,"' 1 1 and 2 that the plaintiff could not adequately repre14
sent the class.

Responding to this, the court ruled that the plaintiff did
adequately represent the interest of the class and that the notice
requirement problem need not be decided "at this juncture"
since the matter of notice will be material only when and if the
court grants certain portions of the relief prayed for."'' 1

The

court looked to the recently amended Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23144 and the federal decisions interpreting it for guidance.1

5

The need for the class action device as an effective remedy
for consumers and other small claimants was well recognized
by the Holstein court. The plaintiff's strong appeal for the allowance of class actions as a consumer tool, was approved by
the court:
A situation ripe for the unjust enrichment of the overreaching
merchant has been created by mass marketing techniques involving millions of consumers residing in many states, lack of effective
regulatory enforcement agencies, and ignorant consumer (sic)
whose relatively small claims cannot justify the cost of legal
action.14

Subsequent to the Circuit Court judge's ruling on Ward's
140 Ruling 16

141 Defendants Brief, 56.
142 Defendant's Brief, 55.
148 Ruling, 23.
14

Id. at 23, 25.

145 Ruling, 24-7.

One of the problems making the management of a
class action burdensome concerns intervenors. The court might find itself
entertaining numerous petitions to intervene and often the reason centers
around the great potential fees available in a class action. However, it must
be borne in mind that this problem is no different than in other cases involving intervention. Intervention is completely within the discretion of the
court. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110, §26.1 (1969). In Fiorito v. Jones, 45 Ill.
2d 15, 236 N.E.2d 833 (1970), the Illinois Supreme Court passed on this
problem. The court followed the literal interpretation of Section 26.1 of
the Civil Practice Act which provides that:
Upon timely application anyone shall be permitted as of right to intervene in an action ... when the representation of the applicant's interest
by existing parties is or may be inadequate and the applicant will or
may be bound by a judgment, decree or order in the action....
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110 26.1 (1970). The court refused the intervention
and stated that "the applicant must show that the existing parties' representation is inadequate." 45 Ill. 2d 15, 17, 256 N.E.2d 833-34 (1970).
',6Ruling, 20. Often, if the "case does not proceed as a class action,
it is unlikely that it would proceed at all." Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D.
472, 485 (E.D.N.Y. 1968).
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motion to strike and dismiss the plaintiff's third amended complaint, Ward and the class of charge account holders effectuated
a settlement.14 7 Therefore, the result of a possible appeal to
the Illinois Appellate Court challenging the maintenance of the
class action in such situations, will be unknown. Therefore, the
Circuit Court decision is at best only persuasive of the modern
approach to consumer class actions and will not be binding as
precedent in a subsequent consumer fraud suit in Illinois. However, the court in Holstein offers hope for the defrauded consumer since the court recognized that certain compelling situations can only be handled by the use of a class action.
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

The successful maintenance of a consumer class action in
Illinois depends upon the courts' interpretation and application
of the three requirements. Generally, the action will require
a proper equitable basis with a sufficient degree of unity between all class members so as to afford all members the protection of due process of law.
The conservative courts may rely on cases like Fetherston,
which merely dismiss the action on technical equity grounds, or
on cases like Newberry Library and Kuehn, which dismiss the
action because each class member was involved in separate and
distinct transactions with the defendant to which different legal
principles might apply. The courts following this approach
would apparently proceed without weighing the common fund
and practical impossibility of other adequate relief in determining whether jurisdiction should be exercised.
More liberal courts, like Holstein, are good indications of
the courts' treatment of class actions in the future. These
courts will utilize the flexible concept of equity jurisdiction, and
guided by due process considerations, will liberally apply the
requirement of "community of interest." The prime reason for
this liberal trend is found in the growing social pressure for an
effective consumer remedy.
While there is no clear authority for the maintenance of a
consumer class action involving fraud and seeking damages as
its sole remedy, a favorable result can obtain where the representatives can prove the existence of a "common fund" or
"concerted action." In other situations, the representatives will
147 The settlement provided that anyone who was a Ward Charge account holder prior to a certain date and who paid premiums on the ChargeAll insurance by mistake, without intending to have the benefits of the insurance program, may file a claim for a refund. Holstein v. Montgomery
Ward & Co., 3 CCH Pov. L. REP. 9652 (No. 68 CH 275 Cir. Ct. Cook County
Stipulation of Compromise of July 9, 1970, approved
March 11, 1969).
by the court December 16, 1970.
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be confined to purely equitable relief or they must persuade
the court to overlook relatively minor differences between the
parties, at least where there is a need for the settlement of all
claims in one litigation.
As illustrated by the court in Holstein, class actions can be
effective tools for remedying widespread consumer abuses. It
would serve Illinois well for all courts to approach class actions
in this manner. The outmoded and archaic interpretations of
the degree of unity required should continue to be relaxed and
policy considerations should be balanced in favor of the maintenance of the class action and the defrauded consumers.
It might also serve Illinois well to adopt a more realistic
approach to consumer class actions. The conflicting decisions on
this subject remain because the legislature has not yet spoken.
It is recommended that the legislature look for guidance to the
recently enacted statute and court rules of other jurisdictions
for a rational framework for judges as well as a proper dele148
gation of discretion to enable tailor-made judgments.
Hopefully, whether through liberalized judicial application
of class action requirements or a new comprehensive statute
or supreme court rule aimed at this problem, class actions may
be made a more effective vehicle for the redress of consumer
fraud in Illinois.
Paul M. Katzovitz

148See FED. R. Civ. P. 23; NATIONAL CONSUMER ACT (1970).
For a
discussion of Federal Rule 23 and general problems facing the class action
device, see generally Cohn, The New Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 54
GEo. L.J. 1204 (1966); Frankel, Some Preliminary Observations Concerning
Civil Rule 23, 43 F.R.D. 39 (1967); Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil
Committee: 1966 Amendments of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (I),
81 HARv. L. REV. 356 (1967); Symposium, The Class Action - A Symposium, 10 B.C. IND. & COMM. L. REV. 497-632 (1969) ; Note, Revised Federal
Rule 23, Class Actions: Surviving Dificulties and New Problems Require
Further Amendment, 52 MINN. L. REV. 509 (1967).

